The Limitations of a Multilingual Legal System by McAuliffe, Karen
 
 
The Limitations of a Multilingual Legal System
McAuliffe, Karen
DOI:
10.1007/s11196-013-9314-0
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
McAuliffe, K 2013, 'The Limitations of a Multilingual Legal System', International Journal for the Semiotics of
Law, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 861-882. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-013-9314-0
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in International Journal for the Semiotics of Law. The final
authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11196-013-9314-0
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com 
 
1 
 
The Limitations of a Multilingual Legal System 
 
Karen McAuliffe* 
 
ABSTRACT.  The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the way in which it 
works can be seen as a microcosm of how a multilingual, multicultural supranationalisation 
process and legal order can be constructed – the Court is a microcosm of the EU as a whole 
and in particular of EU law.  The multilingual jurisprudence produced by the CJEU is 
necessarily shaped by the dynamics within that institution and by the ‘cultural compromises’ 
at play in the production process.  The resultant texts, which make up that jurisprudence, are 
hybrid in nature and inherently approximate.  On the one hand, that approximation can lead 
to discrepancies between language versions of the Court’s case law and thus jeopardise the 
uniform application of EU law.  On the other hand, that approximation and hybridity define 
EU law as a distinct, supranational legal order.  This paper analyses the operation of the 
CJEU and considers whether a linguistic cultural compromise exists within that institution 
which exercises a formative influence on the character of its ‘output’ – i.e. its jurisprudence – 
and what that may mean for our understanding of the development of EU law. 
 
KEY WORDS: Court of Justice of the European Union; CJEU; ECJ; EU law; multilingual 
law; law and language; jurilinguistics; legal translation; cultural compromise; hybrid texts; 
translators; legal drafting. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), once described as being ‘out of sight 
and out of mind by virtue of its location in the fairytale Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the 
benign neglect of the media’ [15], has come increasingly into the spotlight in recent years.  
There is an extensive literature on the CJEU and the main bodies of literature concerning that 
Court (notably legal and political science literatures) focus on its role in developing the EU 
legal order.  Legal literature is generally concerned with analysing the legal logic behind the 
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CJEU’s rulings and discussing how that Court can affect policy changes in the EU, insofar as 
practice may have to change to comply with a particular ruling.  Political science literature, 
on the other hand, is interested in ‘judicial politics’, the policy dynamics that can be inferred 
from the Court’s decisions and in examining the political context and consequences of those 
decisions.  However, each of these bodies of literature remains predominantly focused on the 
decisions of the Court and on judicial reasoning/investigating the reasons or motivation 
behind those decisions.  Much has been written on why the Court makes certain decisions and 
the effects of those decisions.  This paper, however, focuses on how that Court’s multilingual 
jurisprudence is produced and the implications of the process of such production on the EU 
legal landscape.  
 
All students of EU law will be familiar with the jurisdiction and architecture of the EU 
judicial order, including the procedure to be followed in various direct and indirect actions 
before the Court of Justice.  For many scholars, that remains their understanding of, or indeed 
interest in, ‘how the Court of Justice works’1. However, there is far more involved in the 
working of the Court than is elaborated on in most treatises on that institution. 
 
In recent years, anthropologists have shown great interest in EU institutions – in particular 
the European Parliament and Commission – and have carried out various studies of those 
institutions.  Such studies, based on periods of fieldwork research in the services of the 
Parliament and Commission, provide a valuable insight into the workings of those institutions 
and it is interesting to note the significance of culture, identity and language in the policies, 
actions and day-to-day life of the institutions [1-2, 5-6, 8].  In spite of the fact that EU 
institutions are staffed by individuals from member states with diverse social and educational 
backgrounds, languages and cultures, each institution is, by its very nature “obliged to 
express itself with a single voice” [6], presupposing that it has resolved any internal conflicts 
deriving from technical considerations and differing political approaches to similar 
phenomena [8].  The question, for anthropologists, is: how exactly do the EU institutions 
resolve those conflicts?  In their work, Abélès and Bellier make the point that process 
necessarily affects output.  In the context of the European Parliament and Commission the 
‘process’ involves a ‘cultural compromise’ through which European civil servants are able to 
                                                
1 A title borrowed here from: Edwards (1995) [12] – an article which does in fact highlight issues of 
language albeit briefly. 
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work together in the unique hybrid environment of those institutions.  The ‘output’ 
necessarily affected by that cultural compromise relates to the resulting ‘culture of 
compromise’ visible in the policies and actions of those institutions.  Those anthropological 
studies also note the development of a mixed and hybrid ‘eurolanguage’ within the 
institutions, which is the linguistic manifestation of the cultural compromise by which the 
institution works.  Bellier points out that such ‘eurolanguage’ functions perfectly well within 
the institution but can create problems when the Commission engages in discourse with the 
outside world [8].  Bellier analyses the development of a ‘eurolanguage’ within the European 
Commission, however the texts produced by the CJEU also have to resonate 
comprehensively outside of that institution in terms of an EU legal language that is applicable 
throughout all 27 member states2.  In light of this anthropological literature, it is reasonable to 
presume that the process behind the production of the CJEU’s multilingual jurisprudence 
could have implications for the development of EU law.  It follows, therefore, that 
understanding the situational factors of, and compromises involved in, the production of such 
jurisprudence could aid our understanding of EU law. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Premised on the notion that the dynamics within the CJEU, and the perceptions of those who 
work there of their own professional environment, shape the culture of that institution, this 
paper focuses first on the actors at the heart of the production process and investigates some 
of the cultural dynamics at play in that process.  In order to understand and analyse such 
institutional culture, one must understand the priorities and preoccupations of those who 
work there.  This paper is based on fieldwork research, participant observation and 
interviews, carried out at the CJEU between 2002 and 2011.  Participant observation involved 
observing the interactions among lawyer-linguists and between those lawyer-linguists and 
members of the Court and their référendaires3, both in professional contexts such as 
meetings, seminars etc. and more informal contexts such as Court social functions, coffee 
breaks, lunchtimes etc.; engaging to some extent in those activities; interacting with 
participants socially and identifying and developing relationships with key stakeholders and 
                                                
2 At the time of going to press there are 27 member states of the European Union. 
3 The personal legal assistants who work for the judges and Advocates General at the CJEU.  The 
French word référendaire is used throughout this paper instead of the English translation ‘legal 
secretary’ since it is by that title that those assistants are known within the Court, the working 
language being French. 
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gatekeepers.  To overcome any inherent bias in the data obtained through participant 
observation, the findings were triangulated with existing literature concerning the CJEU, 
concepts developed in translation theory literature as well as with the findings of comparable 
studies carried out in other EU institutions4.  The interview sample consisted of 78 
interviewees in total (56 lawyer-linguists; 5 judges; 3 Advocates General and 14 
référendaires)5. 
 
While it is generally accepted that language cannot be divorced from culture; and the cultural 
or multicultural, aspect of an institution will necessarily affect its output [7], the present paper 
is concerned with the multilingual, opposed to the multicultural aspects of the Court’s 
jurisprudence.  The reason for such choice of focus lies in the nature of the Court’s ‘output’: 
the CJEU aims to produce statements of law that have the same effect in every language in 
which they are published and through such statements to ensure the uniform application of 
EU law.  Yet those statements of law consist primarily of collegiate judgments drafted by 
jurists in a language that is generally not their mother tongue.  Moreover, those statements of 
law undergo many permutations of translation into and out of up to 23 different languages 
and they are necessarily shaped by the way in which the Court functions as a multilingual, 
multicultural organisation and the final ‘authentic’ judgments, as presented to the outside 
world, are, for the most part, translations.  
 
3. LANGUAGE AT THE CJEU 
 
The importance of the multilingual aspect of the CJEU’s work has come increasingly to the 
fore in recent years, particularly since the ‘mega-enlargement’ of 2004 [16].  Indeed, the 
‘General Presentation’ of the Court, as stated on its own website6 consists of only two 
paragraphs, the first setting out the ‘mission’ of that Court and the second stating: 
 
“As each Member State has its own language and specific legal system, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union is a multilingual institution.  Its language 
                                                
4 In particular those carried out by Marc Abélès and Irène Bellier on the European Parliament and 
Commission, see supra. 
5 Apart from slight editing (in parenthesis), the quotations in this paper are as they were recorded.  
Interviewees are identified only as far as the group to which they belong (i.e. lawyer-linguists, judges, 
Advocates General, référendaires). 
6 www.curia.europa.eu 
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com 
 
5 
 
arrangements have no equivalent in any other court in the world, since each of the 
official languages of the European Union can be the language of a case.  The Court is 
required to observe the principle of multilingualism in full, because of the need to 
communicate with the parties in the language of proceedings and to ensure that its 
case-law is disseminated throughout the Member States.”7 
 
The role of language and translation in proceedings before the Court is also clearly set out in 
its Rules of Procedure8 and other literature9.  Article 22 of the Rules of Procedure states: 
 
“The Court shall set up a translating service staffed by experts with adequate legal 
training and a thorough knowledge of several official languages of the Court.”10 
 
That ‘translating service’ (Translation Directorate) makes up almost half of the Court’s total 
staff and is the largest ‘service’ of that institution11.  The lawyer-linguists employed in the 
translation directorate are responsible for translation into French (the working language of the 
Court) of documents lodged by parties and interveners to a case and the subsequent 
translation into all of the EU official languages of judgments and orders of the Court (as well 
as, where relevant, advocates general’s opinions). 
 
Unlike the other EU institutions, the CJEU operates using a single internal working language 
– French.  For every action before the CJEU there is a language of procedure (which can be 
any one of the 23 official EU languages12 ), which must be used in the written submissions or 
observations submitted for all oral submissions in the action.  The language of procedure of 
                                                
7 http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/ (as at 17/01/13). 
8 Articles 29 to 31 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice set out the rules governing 
language at that institution.  For proceedings before the General Court, the relevant provisions are 
Articles 35-37 of its Rules of Procedure.  Under Article 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil 
Service Tribunal, those provisions also apply to that tribunal.  These rules for language use reflect 
those set out in Regulation 1/58 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic 
Community [1958] JO 17/385 (English Special Edition: Series 1, Chapter 1952-1958, p. 59). 
9 See http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_10742/direction-generale-de-la-traduction (as at 17/01/13). 
10 Art. 22, Consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 19 June 1991 (as 
amended) [2010] OJ C 177/3. 
11 In 2008 the Translation Directorate employed 876 staff – 46% of the Court’s total staff. 
12 At the time of going to press there are 23 official EU languages.  These are, in English alphabetical 
order: Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, 
Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovakian, 
Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish.  The official order of these languages is to list them according to the 
way they are spelled each in their own language. 
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the case must also be used by the Court in any correspondence, report, or decision addressed 
to the parties in the case.  Only the texts in the language of procedure are authentic, which 
means that, in most cases, the ‘authentic’ version of a judgment will be a translation of the 
original judgment drafted and deliberated on in French [20].  It is clear therefore, that 
translation plays a significant role in the working of the CJEU.  However, translation is not 
the only language issue in the production of the multilingual jurisprudence of that court.  
From submission of the initial application through to delivery of the final judgment the role 
of language and the impact that it has on the process of production of that jurisprudence is 
significant. 
 
4. THE PROCESS OF PRODUCING A TEXT: A LINGUISTIC CULTURAL 
COMPROMISE? 
 
Producing the CJEU’s multilingual jurisprudence is a complex process: case files (including a 
draft judgment produced prior to deliberations) are prepared by judges and référendaires 
together; Advocates General and their référendaires prepare the opinion (where relevant) and 
finally the relevant chamber of judges prepare the final collegiate judgment in secret 
deliberations.  In addition to the, often complicated, legal reasoning and application of EU 
law throughout that process, those actors are drafting the various documents in a language 
which for most of them is not their mother tongue [17, 19].  Those documents (judgments, 
orders, AGs’ opinions) – the ‘output’ of the Court – are then translated into the other 22 
official EU languages, and, in the case of judgments, more often than not the authentic 
version of that judgment will be a translation.  For an overview of the full process see Figures 
1-4. 
 
From the participant observation and interviews carried out for the purpose of the present 
paper, it is clear that, similarly to the ‘cultural compromise’ evident in the Commission and 
Parliament (see supra), there is a similar linguistic cultural compromise within the CJEU, 
which exercises a formative influence on the working of the institution and the character of 
its ‘output’ (i.e. its jurisprudence).  It appears, in fact, that there are two types of linguistic 
cultural compromise at play in the working of the Court. 
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First, there is the linguistic cultural compromise involved in producing the Court’s case law.  
The collegiate judgments of the CJEU are, by their very nature, compromise documents.  The 
wording chosen in a (French language) judgment has very often been the subject of 
painstaking deliberations.  However, because the deliberations are secret it is impossible for 
anyone other than the judges involved to know where compromises lie in the text.  This has 
implications both for the subsequent translation of such judgments and also for the drafting of 
future judgments (insofar as those drafting subsequent judgments will not know if the 
wording of certain sections of the text in question was a compromise and therefore important 
to retain in any reference to the text).  Furthermore, the case law of the CJEU is shaped by the 
language in which it is drafted – i.e. French. 
 
Although most référendaires claim to work solely in French, when interviewed, the majority 
actually admitted to drafting ‘half in [their own mother tongue] and half in French’: 
 
“I tend to translate what I want to say into French instead of really working in 
French” (référendaire, interviewee’s emphasis) 
 
Part of the linguistic cultural compromise in the production of the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
involves the amalgamation of legal reasoning and method from many European legal orders 
due to the fact that those producing that jurisprudence are working in a language which is not 
their mother tongue or that through which they may have learned EU law.  That particular 
‘cultural compromise’ necessarily affects the Court’s ‘output’: 
 
“While it is more difficult for someone to draft in a language that isn’t their own, it is 
also a good idea since writing in a foreign language ‘formalises’ the text”; 
 
“While it can be difficult to find terms in a foreign language that meet your exact 
thinking, working in a foreign language can also help you to find answers to legal 
problems that you wouldn’t have found in your own language”. 
 
Furthermore, because French is rarely the mother tongue of those drafting that case law, there 
is a tendency to repeat expressions and to ‘cut and paste’ from previous case law or source 
documents.  Together with the difficulties of manipulating a language that is not one’s own, 
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the result is often a stilted and awkward text.  In addition, those drafting the case law of the 
CJEU are constrained in their use of language and style of writing (owing to pressures of 
technology and in order to reinforce the rule of law being developed).  The resulting texts, as 
this author has previous submitted, are hybrid in nature and this hybridity itself shapes the 
development of EU law13: 
 
“It is often difficult to say exactly what you want to say in a judgment… often the 
Court will want to say X but in the very rigid and hybrid language of the Court that is 
used in the judgments you have to get around to X by saying that it is not Y! …such 
use of language necessarily has implications for the way in which the case law 
develops…” (référendaire). 
 
Secondly, the case law of the CJEU is ‘filtered out’ through the linguistic cultural 
compromises involved in translation.  Translation itself is a ‘linguistic cultural compromise’ 
and all translation, including legal translation, involves an element of approximation.  The 
difficulties of translating the, already hybrid, case law of the CJEU have been well 
documented by the present author [16-21].  While the role of the lawyer-linguists who 
produce the translations may be “the perfect synthesis of a lawyer and a linguist”, there are 
nonetheless many difficulties which arise due to the ambiguity and approximation inherent in 
translation [17, 20-21].  In addition to those classic problems of translation (and legal 
translation in particular) such as ambiguity, translation of ‘untranslatable’ legal concepts, the 
effects of translated legal texts etc., translation at the CJEU is also affected by the role 
perceptions of lawyer-linguists who struggle to balance a dual professional identity.  The 
loyalties of those lawyer-linguists are divided between ‘the law’ and ‘language’.  On the one 
hand, they have a responsibility as lawyers to ensure that their translations are legally sound 
and represent the statement of law that the Court wishes to make.  On the other hand, they are 
linguists, and as such must accept the inherent approximation involved in translation.  The 
lawyer-linguists work at the interface of law and language, dealing with the relationship 
between those two concepts on a daily basis.  The necessary compromise resulting from the 
struggle to reconcile the notions of ‘law’ and ‘translation’ is reflected in the process whereby 
the case law of the Court is ‘filtered’ out to the wider EU14. 
                                                
13 Cf McAuliffe (2011) [17].  See also McAuliffe (2013) [19] for a discussion of how that hybrid 
‘Court French’ has led to a type of precedent in CJEU case law. 
14 For a more in-depth discussion of this see McAuliffe 2010 [18]. 
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5. ISSUES OF TRANSLATION 
 
Everybody involved in producing the case law of the CJEU acknowledges that translation 
necessarily involves an element of approximation and that there are also frequent 
discrepancies, both avoidable and unavoidable, between translated documents.  A number of 
judges, interviewed for the purposes of the present paper, pointed out that, as a result of the 
significant time pressures on the French translation division at the Court, the quality of 
procedural documents into French varies; and admitted that: 
 
“…if I feel that a document has been rushed through translation, and where I 
understand the language of the original document, I tend to work from that original”. 
 
One judge commented that in some cases, where a judge has been working from the original 
documents and the référendaire has been working from the French translations of those 
documents: 
 
“…[the judge and référendaire] will end up understanding different things about the 
case in question – it is almost as though [they] are reading two slightly different 
cases…” 
 
Another issue that highlights the members’ awareness of approximation and discrepancies in 
translation is their reaction to the introduction of pivot translation at the Court in May 2004.  
That system is actually a mixed translation system – whenever possible, direct translation is 
used instead of translation through a ‘pivot language’.  There are five pivot languages in use 
at the CJEU: French, English, German, Spanish and Italian.  Those five languages are 
‘partnered’ with a number of the ‘post-2004’ languages.  Documents are translated into the 
‘partner’ or pivot language and from that translation can be further translated into all other 
EU official languages15 (for an overview of the pivot translation system at the CJEU see 
McAuliffe 2008). 
                                                
15 Because French is the working language of the Court, the French translation division provides 
translation from all of the post-2004 official languages while each of the other four pivot language 
divisions are ‘partnered’ with two or three post-2004 official languages.  The German language 
division provides translation from Bulgarian, Estonian and Polish; the English language division from 
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While the members of the CJEU accept that some form of pivot or inter-lingual translation is 
necessary in order to successfully produce case law in 23 languages, those members 
interviewed for the purposes of the present paper remained somewhat uneasy about the use of 
that system of translation by the Court.  A number of those interviewed described pivot 
translation as “dangerous” and claimed that it “exacerbates any problems already existing 
within the translation system”.  Thus, most members of the Court do have a sense that 
“translation is an approximation”.   
 
All of those interviewed commented that the Court’s judgments are “shaped by the fact that 
the working language at the Court is French” and those judgments are drafted in French.  
Most lawyer-linguists, référendaires and even judges feel that the Court’s judgments are too 
formulaic, stilted and pompous in style.  Interestingly, most of the judges interviewed blamed 
this on “the translators adhering too literally to the French originals” and not on the fact that 
those documents are drafted, for the most part, by non-francophones, or that they are quite 
often the product of a compromise in deliberations (during which the precise wording of a 
particular phrase may be discussed for days or even weeks), or indeed that the nature of those 
judgments makes it almost impossible for them to be drafted in a free-flowing or easily 
readable style16. 
 
The compromise which results from the reconciliation of two sets of norms (of translation 
and law) by the Court’s lawyer-linguists is thus widely acknowledged and accepted by the 
small legal community within that Court.  However, as has been shown here, the linguistic 
cultural compromise in the production of the Court’s case law is inherent in all stages of that 
production process – not just the translation stage.  As mentioned above, such a hybrid 
eurolanguage does not tend to cause difficulty within the institution itself, but can create 
problems when that institution engages in discourse with the outside world.  Such 
‘engagement’ on the part of the CJEU involves the interpretations and application of EU law 
                                                                                                                                                  
Czech and Lithuanian; the Spanish language division from Hungarian and Latvian; and the Italian 
language division from Romanian, Slovak and Slovenian.  Neither Maltese nor Irish have been 
assigned to a pivot language division.  Since English is the second official language of both Malta and 
Ireland, it is assumed that the Maltese and Irish lawyer-linguists are able to provide English 
translations of documents in Maltese and Irish where necessary. 
16 Note, this is in stark contrast to reports from référendaires interviewed, who all claim that they are 
strictly bound as regards the style of those documents and what phrases etc. they may use – see further 
McAuliffe 2011 [17]. 
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and consequently the development of a legal order based on the principle of uniformity of 
that law across all member states. 
 
6. THE PROBLEMS: SOME EXAMPLES 
 
“Language versions of a judgment of the [CJEU] cannot be identical because [those 
drafting and translating them] have so many different ways of working… the vast 
majority of those who actually use the judgments are not aware of this, which, in a 
supranational, supposedly uniform legal order, is hardly an ideal situation” (lawyer-
linguist, interviewee’s emphasis). 
 
Some approximations between different language versions of CJEU judgments and other EU 
legal instruments simply cannot be avoided.  For example, the translation of the English 
“cartel”, into French as either “entente”, “accord” or even “cartel”, none of which have 
exactly the same meaning as “cartel” does in English.  One lawyer-linguist interviewed used 
this example to highlight the relationship between European law, language and translation: 
 
“…as well as the linguistic problem there is also a legal problem: we all accept that 
cartels are illegal – but since ‘cartel’ doesn’t translate exactly from on language to 
another [in this case, English to French] how do we know what behaviour is illegal 
under European law?  In [the French language version of Article 104 TFEU] words 
such as ‘entente’ and ‘accord’ are used, and [from that language] it seems that even 
discussions and negotiations can be illegal: a concurrence of wills to act on the 
market in a specific way will be contrary to the provisions on competition in the 
[TFEU].  This is much more punitive than would be the case in many member state 
legal systems where a practice would have to be much further down the line of a 
cartel to make it illegal…”17 
 
Another example raised by a large number of those interviewed for the present paper is the 
unavoidable approximation involved in rendering the legal notion of a “trust” in a language 
other than English.  Even the word “contract” in English does not fully correspond to 
“contrat” in French or “vertrag” in German since (among other distinctions) a “contract” in 
                                                
17 Similarly, see infra re Replica Sports Kit cases. 
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English relates to an agreement based on the concept of “consideration” and “contrat” in 
French or “vertrag” in German do not imply the same notion of consideration.18  
 
According to all of the lawyer-linguists and the majority of référendaires interviewed for the 
purposes of the present paper, the process of producing case law at the CJEU can potentially 
lead to problems of a legal nature: 
 
“Where an original [judgment] is not readily comprehensible… and lawyer-linguists 
working to a tight deadline do not want to lose time in lengthy discussions with the 
cabinet concerned, there is a risk that [the lawyer-linguists in question] will adopt 
their own individual solutions.  …This can lead to divergence among language 
versions [of judgments] and potentially to the misapplication of [EU] law”. 
 
One such example can be found in the order of the General Court of 2 June 1997 in Case T-
60/9619: 
 
This case concerned an application for the annulment of certain Commission decisions 
refusing authorisation by a number of EU member states to take protective measures with 
regard to Spanish pharmaceutical products.  The language of the case (i.e. the authentic 
version of the order) was English.  According to the normal procedure of the then Court of 
First Instance, the order in question was drafted in French and subsequently translated into 
other EU official languages.  Paragraph 44 of that order referred to “un droit subjectif 
préexistant des titulaires des brevets en cause”.  However, “un droit subjectif” is a legal 
concept that exists in civil law jurisdictions but not in common law jurisdictions and thus has 
no equivalent in English (the authentic language of the order in question).  This problem was 
brought to the attention of the judges in the relevant chamber, who deliberated over it for a 
considerable period of time and eventually decided that the phrase should be changed and 
that, in English, it should refer simply to a “pre-existing right of the patent holder”.  
However, it appears that the original French language version of that order was never 
amended and, to this day, refers to “un droit subjectif”. 
 
                                                
18 For further and more in-depth discussion of such issues, see: Šarčević (1989) 23; de Leo (1999) 
[11]; Lane (1982) [14]; Sacco (1999) [22]. 
19 Merck and Others v Commission [1997] ECR II-849. 
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The danger in that case, according to the lawyer-linguists and référendaires interviewed, is 
that, since only the English language version of the order was amended, the right referred to 
in that order could be understood differently in member states with common law legal orders 
than in member states with civil law legal orders, thereby potentially jeopardising the 
‘uniform application’ of EU law20 
 
Another example of a translation problem that, according to those lawyer-linguists and 
référendaires, could possibly have far-reaching legal consequences, can be seen in an order of 
the Court of Justice regarding waste management21: 
 
In Council Directive 75/442/EEC22, the word “réemploi” is used in French, and “reuse” is 
used in English.  That term is not defined in the directive itself but is defined in various 
waste-related legislation and papers on the EU waste management hierarchy as referring to a 
substance or object that us used again for the same purpose as that for which it was originally 
used.  The primary meaning of the term ‘re-use’, as found in the EU waste hierarchy, is the 
repeated use of non-hazardous wastes, such as, for example, paper, used clothing and glass, 
in their original form.  Waste can also be ‘re-used as part of a recovery operation, such as 
operation R1 in Annex II B of the Directive – “use principally as a fuel or other means to 
generate energy”.  Case C-235/02 centred on the “reutilisation”, as fuel, of petroleum 
refining by-products, which are classified as hazardous waste and therefore cannot be "re-
used” (except as part of a recovery operation)23.  It seems that the industries in question in 
that case were burning those by-products and using the energy produced from burning them 
as fuel – claiming, therefore, that it was a “recovery action”.  In the French language version 
of the order in question (i.e. the language in which it was originally drafted), the term 
“reutilisation” is used to describe such use.  Since that word is different from “réemploi” as 
used in the French language version of Directive 75/442, in the opinion of the person drafting 
                                                
20 Note: when asked to comment on this case in particular, all but one of the judges interviewed felt 
that the difference between the language versions was a “non-issue” (see infra re: teleological 
interpretation and a distinct EU legal language).  One judge felt that the discrepancy in question was 
“a grave mistake” but that it was “of no real importance since the authentic version of that order is in 
English”. 
21 Order of the Court (Third Chamber) of 15 Jan 2004 in Case C-235/02 Criminal proceedings against 
Marco Antonio Saetti and Andrea Frediani[2004] ECR I-1005. 
22 Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste (OJ L 194, p. 39-41) as amended by 
Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991 (OJ L 78, p. 32-37). 
23 See Council Directive 75/442/EEC, Annex II B, operation R9 (note: such hazardous waste must be 
disposed of under very specific, strict conditions). 
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the order in question there was no problem.  However, while the word “reutilisation” can be 
translated into English as “recuperation” or “recovery”, the far more usual translation would 
be “reuse”, and therein lies the problem (in particular since the authentic language version of 
most cases before the CJEU concerning waste management is English).  The “réutilisation” 
of the toxic waste referred to in the order is not in fact “reuse” as meaning a product being 
used again for its original purpose: rather, if it is considered a waste, it would be re-use as 
part of a recovery operation.  However, if the Court were to use the word “reuse” with 
reference to certain toxic substances that would normally be considered hazardous, one might 
reasonably assume that the substances in question are not to be considered hazardous (and 
can therefore be disposed of or dealt with without having to conform to any special criteria 
under Council Directive 75/442/EEC or Council Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 
on hazardous waste24). 
 
In the order in question, “réutilisation" was, in fact, rendered in English as “further use”25.  
However, that particular translation resulted from the fact that the lawyer-linguist responsible 
for translating the order into English was an expert in waste management!  That lawyer-
linguist deliberately avoided using the term “reuse” because of what she regarded as the 
potential consequences of such use: 
 
“If a référendaire who is weak in French and doesn’t understand the technicalities of 
waste issues, drafts an order or judgment [in French] using words which have a very 
specific technical meaning, without understanding the nuances of those words; and 
the judgment is then translated… by a lawyer-linguist who also has no technical 
knowledge of the subject, toxic waste, which cannot under any circumstances be ‘re-
used’ but which must be subject to either a disposal or a recovery operation, might 
wind up described as being ‘re-used’.  That, in turn, would create a feedback loop 
whereby hazardous wastes – by virtue of being capable of re-use – are no longer 
hazardous but are merely waste.  And while they are being used, they will not even be 
waste any longer, until further discard takes place.  Whereas, if they are hazardous 
                                                
24 OJ L 377, p. 20-27. 
25 In the case in question, however, the Court decided that, in fact, the waste by-product should not be 
considered a waste at all but rather an integral part of the production process, because it was to be 
used again, and fully, without further processing. 
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com 
 
15 
 
waste, they remain waste no matter how they are used and are subject to strict 
conditions of use”. 
 
There is of course, no guarantee that all waste management judgments or orders will be 
translated by lawyer-linguists who are technical experts in that field!  All of the lawyer-
linguists interviewed for this paper felt that is was “extremely likely” that “réutilisation" in 
French would “usually be translated as reuse” in English.  One lawyer-linguist commented 
that: 
 
“…the use of that one little word could completely change the hierarchy of waste 
management in the European Union: industries could potentially bring an action 
claiming that the substances in question in those cases cannot be hazardous because 
they are being ‘reused’ within the meaning of [Council Directive 75/442/EEC]”. 
 
In their book The Court of Justice of the European Communities, Neville Brown and Tom 
Kennedy highlight Case 131/7926 as an example of approximation between different language 
versions of judgments of the Court [10].  In that case a preliminary ruling was sought on 
whether a lapse of time could render a recommendation to deport invalid under Council 
Directive 64/22127.  The Court, in the English language version of the judgment (which was 
the authentic version in that case), provided a criterion in terms of whether the lapse of time 
“is liable to deprive” such recommendation of its validity.  Brown and Kennedy point out that 
the French language version of that judgment (i.e. the original version drafted) was more 
precise, employing the words “est de nature à priver”28; and that the ambiguity of the English 
language version of that judgment “may have misled the Divisional Court and the Court of 
Appeal in their application of the ruling”29. 
 
                                                
26 R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Santillo [1980] ECR 1585. 
27 Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures 
concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health. 
28 However, Brown and Kennedy classify this discrepancy between the language versions as a 
mistranslation that has slipped through the “safeguards” in place at the Court to prevent mistakes in 
translation (such as having translations checked by the judge whose native tongue is that of the 
language of the case).  In fact, the discrepancy between the language versions in the Santillo case is 
more likely to have been a result of approximation in translation than a mistake that managed to go 
unnoticed by the relevant judge.  
29 Brown and Kennedy (2000) [10].  See also: Barav (1981) [3]. 
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A similar issue more recently arose in a series of cases before the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal in the UK30 (the replica sports kit cases) in which the applicants sought to rely on 
the wording of the English language judgment of the General Court in Case T-25/9531, which 
sets out the requirements for a concerted practice.  Paragraph 1852 of the English language 
version of that judgment states: 
 
“In order to prove that there has been a concerted practice, it is not necessary to 
show that the competitor in question has formally undertaken, in respect of one or 
several others, to adopt a particular course of conduct or that the competitors have 
colluded over their future conduct on the market.  It is sufficient that by its statement 
of intention the competitor should have eliminated, or at the very least, substantially 
reduced uncertainty as to the conduct to expect of the other on the market” (my 
emphasis). 
 
However, if one considers the French language version (that is, the original judgment 
drafted), which states: 
 
“Il suffit que, à travers sa déclaration d’intention, le concurrent ait éliminé ou à tout 
le moins substantiellement réduit l’incertitude quant au comportement à attendre de 
sa part sur le marché” (my emphasis) 
 
It seems that, for a concerted practice to exist, it is sufficient that two competitors (A and B) 
meet and that A receives information about B’s likely conduct; whereas the English language 
version implies that A has to indicate his own conduct to B32.  That case was relatively 
unusual in that there were nine languages of the case and therefore nine equally authentic 
language versions of the judgment (Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, 
Portuguese and Spanish).  As a result, the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal compared four of 
those language versions of the judgment (French, German, Italian and Spanish) and 
                                                
30 Case numbers 1019-1022/1/03 Umbro Holdings Ltd v Office of Fair Trading; Manchester United 
PLC v Office of Fair Trading; Allsports Ltd v Office of Fair Trading; JJB Sports PLC v Office of Fair 
Trading [2005] CAT 22. 
31 Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission [2000] ECR II-491. 
32 In the case before the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal there had been a meeting where the JJB 
witness claimed that he had received information about other competitors but did not tell them what 
he intended to do. 
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concluded that they were indeed “translated slightly differently” from the English language 
version33, the correct rendering of which should be: 
 
“In order to prove that there has been a concerted practice, it is not… necessary to 
show that the competitor in question has formally undertaken, in respect of one or 
several others, to adopt a particular course of conduct or that the competitors have 
colluded over their future conduct on the market… It is sufficient that, by its statement 
of intenion, the competitor should have eliminated or at the very least, substantially 
reduced uncertainty as to the conduct [on the market to be expected on his part]”34. 
 
In other words, the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal agreed with the respondent that the 
French language version was correct. 
 
It appears therefore that discrepancies and approximations in translation at the CJEU can 
indeed have consequences for the application of EU law at a Member State level.  In the latter 
example there were a number of authentic language versions of the judgment in question, 
however, would the ruling of the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal have been any different 
had the English language version of Case T-25/95 been the only authentic version of that 
judgment?  How realistic is it to expect member state courts and tribunals to compare up to 
23 different language versions of a CJEU judgment before interpreting that judgment, in 
particular where that Court official declares only one of those language versions authentic?35 
 
7. TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION AND A NEW EU LEGAL LANGUAGE 
 
All of those interviewed for the present paper agreed that not only is it: 
 
“…not possible to render exactly the same meaning from one legal text in one 
language to another legal text in another language” (référendaire) 
 
but that: 
                                                
33 Case numbers 1021/1/03 and 1022/1/03 Allsports Ltd v Office of Fair Trading and JJB Sports PLC 
v Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 17, paragraph 159. 
34 Ibid. 
35 For an excellent examination of the CILFIT criteria from the perspective of legal linguistics see: 
Kjar (2010) [13]. 
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“Approximation [in EU law] goes on at the legal level as well as at the linguistic 
level” (référendaire); 
 
“There are approximations throughout the entire body of European law – legislation, 
case law, every part of it…” (judge). 
 
However, those interviewees were evenly divided regarding their opinions on the problems 
that such approximation causes, or may potentially cause36.  Those who feel that such 
approximation is unproblematic claim that this is largely because “how you deal with that 
approximation is a matter of convention and common sense”: 
 
“…of course, any word will have a different semantic field in another language – 98% 
will be the same, 2% different – but when the reader has the whole context he can 
hone in on the exact meaning… the context can make things 100% precise” 
(référendaire; interviewee’s emphasis); 
  
“Approximation in translation at the Court of Justice isn’t a problem because at the 
end of the day everyone knows what is meant by a particular translation” 
(référendaire). 
 
It appears that, while it is accepted that there is approximation involved in producing the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU, it is also accepted that those who use that law will acknowledge 
that exact transpositions of concepts are impossible to achieve, yet will understand the “EU 
meaning” of those concepts.  It seems that that notion of an ‘EU meaning’ is the key to how 
EU legal language copies with its multilingual nature and with the approximations that 
necessarily occur within it; it is quite simply, a new legal language: 
 
“There are European concepts that may be new to a reader and may not translate 
easily or sound right in the target language but it is for the case law then to ‘fill out’ 
those concepts… and thus ‘eurospeak’ has evolved”” (référendaire); 
                                                
36 40 of the 78 interviewed felt that language issues could have potentially serious and far-reaching 
consequences as highlighted in the examples above.  The remaining 38 felt that issues of language 
pose no particular problems for the application of EU law. 
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“Concepts of EU law are expressed in an EU legal language and while some 
terminology might be the same as that used in individual national legal systems, when 
used in an EU law context, that terminology has a meaning distinct and separate from 
the ‘national’ meaning” (judge). 
 
That new EU legal language was, famously, expressly acknowledged by the CJEU in 
CILFIT, in which the Court stated that: 
 
“…even where the different language versions [of EU legislation] are entirely in 
accord with one another… [EU] law uses terminology which is peculiar to it.  
Furthermore, it must be emphasised that legal concepts do not necessarily have the 
same meaning in [EU] law and in the law of the various member states”37. 
 
That ‘EU language’, or ‘eurospeak’, is used throughout all of the EU institutions, and those 
who use it are aware that it does indeed have a distinct and specific EU meaning: 
 
“Everyone [who works in the EU institutions] knows that the phrases and terminology 
used in EU law are really just labels that are stuck on new concepts in a new legal 
order” (référendaire). 
 
However, the question arises whether those who do not work within the EU institutions but 
who use and apply EU law are equally conscious of the fact that they are working with an 
independent and distinct EU legal language.  As Barents points out: 
 
“It is natural that lawyers confronted with a term of [EU law] in their own language, 
tend to interpret this term within the framework of their own way of legal thinking, 
which in turn is often influenced by concepts, approaches and features which are 
proper to the legal culture they belong to” [4]. 
 
It has been submitted that the very nature of the distinctive, synthetic language of EU law 
may actually help to ensure the uniform application of that law since the hybrid character of 
                                                
37 Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415, paragraph 19. 
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the case law of the CJEU highlights the distinct nature of EU law and the EU legal order [17].  
The subsequent (re)translation of that case law into ‘hybrid’ or ‘stilted’ forms of member 
states’ national languages can serve to alert readers and those using such case law to the fact 
that they are dealing not with their own national legal language but with a new and distinct 
EU legal language: 
 
“…it’s like putting sleeping policemen in the text – little words which will nudge the 
reader into the awareness that he’s not dealing with his own national legal order” 
(lawyer-linguist). 
 
One judge interviewed stated, where there are discrepancies between the language versions of 
judgments, and in the rare cases where the CJEU may be called to decide between two or 
more different language versions of a judgment, that: 
 
“[the CJEU] will not necessarily look at the authentic version of the judgment (which 
is, after all, a translation), but will read all of the language versions and then decide 
which version (or versions) is to be considered correct and only at that stage provide 
reasoning for that decision, taking account of the legal order as it stands at that 
particular time”. 
  
That approach would appear to be in line with the Court’s approach when faced with issues 
arising as a result of linguistic differences between language versions of EU legislation, first 
set out in a 1969 judgment in which the Court stated that EU legislation must be interpreted 
 
“on the bases of both the real intention of its author and the aim he seeks to achieve, 
in the light in particular of the versions in all [official] languages”38. 
 
That method of teleological interpretation advocated by the CJEU became the established 
method for the interpretation of EU law, and has always been linked with the language and 
translation issue.  In a 1973 judgment, the Court reinforced that link between 
language/translation and its teleological method of interpretation – playing down the 
relevance of linguistic discrepancies between different language versions of legislation: 
                                                
38 Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 7. 
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“No argument can be drawn… from any linguistic divergences between the various 
language versions [of EU legislation], as the meaning of the provisions in question 
must be determined with respect to their objective”39 
 
In the CILFIT judgment, in 1982, the Court acknowledged the importance and validity of all 
language versions of EU legislation, stating that teleological interpretation necessarily begins 
with a comparison of the different language versions of the relevant legislation: 
 
“An interpretation of a provision of [EU] law… involves a comparison of the different 
language versions… every provision of  [EU] law must be placed in its context and 
interpreted in the light of the provision of [EU] law as a whole, regard being had to 
the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in 
question is to be applied”40. 
 
The CJEU reiterated its interpretative approach in Case 100/84: 
 
“…in the case of divergence between the language versions the provision in question 
must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of 
which it forms a part”41. 
 
The CJEU continued to reiterate that approach in its case law throughout the 1980s 90s and 
continues to the present day42.  As stated in the General Court judgment in joined cases T-
22/02 and T-23/02: 
 
“According to settled case-law, whilst the need for a uniform interpretation of [EU] 
regulations means that a particular provision should not be considered in isolation 
but, in cases of doubt, should be interpreted and applied in the light of the other 
                                                
39 Case 6/72 Mij PPW International NV v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1973] ECR 
301, paragraph 14. 
40 Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministry of Health, cited above, paragraphs 18 to 20. 
41 Case 100/84 Commission v UK [1985] ECR 1169, paragraph 17. 
42 See, for example, Case C-236/97 Codan [1998] ECR I-8679, paragraph 26; Case C-420/98 W.N. 
[2000] ECR I-2847, paragraph 21; Case C-257/00 Givane and Others [2003] ECR I-345, paragraph 
36 and Case C-152/01 KyoceraElectronics Europe [2003] ECR I-13821, paragraph 33. 
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official languages, in the case of divergence between language versions, the provision 
in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the 
rules of which it forms part”43. 
 
In the same way that it has acknowledged the existence of a new EU legal language in its 
case law, so too has the CJEU specifically acknowledged that, in certain cases, that EU legal 
language, while it retains an overall ‘EU meaning’, may not necessarily refer to exactly the 
same thing in various member states – thereby tacitly acknowledging the approximation that 
exists in the translation of EU law from one language to another.  For example, in Case 
327/8244, the CJEU considered that a single term (“thin flank” in Commission Regulation No 
2787/8145) could be assumed to refer to different cuts of meat in different member states, it 
had no uniform precise anatomical definition but depended on various cutting and boning 
methods, themselves varying according to consumer habits and trade practices.  In those 
circumstances the Court decided that it was not for it to provide a uniform EU definition – 
but this did not preclude the Regulation from bring ‘uniformly binding’ throughout the EU46. 
 
Thus, it seems that the CJEU functions in the way that it does, producing case law in 23 
different languages to be ‘uniformly’ applied in 27 different member states, quite simply 
because the actors within that Court are aware, if not of the relationship and compromise 
between law and language, that: 
 
“…the entire system of EU law is a legal system built from approximations of law and 
language from different legal cultures and different legal languages, come together to 
form a new supranational legal system with its own language” (référendaire, 
interviewee’s emphasis). 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
                                                
43 Joined Cases T-22/02 and T-23/02 Sumitomo Chemical Co. Ltd and Sumika Fine Chemicals Co. 
Ltd v Commission [2005] ECR II-04065, paragraph 46. 
44 EKRO v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees [1984] ECR 107. 
45 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2721/81 of 17 September 1981 on the advance fixing of export 
refunds for beef and veal (OJ 1981 L 265, p. 17). 
46 EKRO v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, cited above, paragraph 7 et seq. 
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The teleological interpretative method employed by the CJEU assumes a normative, platonic 
notion of ‘EU law’ which is expressed in one language that exists in many linguistic versions.  
The Court itself seems to claim that while those linguistic versions may differ from each 
other on a purely linguistic level, at the legal level they express the same concepts (i.e. each  
linguistic version of EU law draws from the same EU legal concepts and therefore forms the 
same, new EU legal language).  As mentioned above, the concept of hybridisation supports 
such arguments – it is only through a ‘new’ hybrid language that EU law may be properly 
understood.  Similarly, approximation in language and translation in the EU can actually 
fulfil a positive role in ensuring the effectiveness of the legal order – indeed one could argue 
that the continued effectiveness of EU law is in fact dependent on its hybrid nature.  The EU 
legal order functions precisely because of the implicit understanding among those who work 
at the EU level of the indeterminate and imprecise nature of language and law. 
 
It is certainly true that many of the language and translation problems arising in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU can be overcome through teleological interpretation or by 
reference to a ‘new’ EU legal language.  In spite of that, however, there are certain instances 
where language and translation do cause problems in relation to the case law of the CJEU.  
The examples highlighted in this paper can be taken as an indication of a wider trend within 
that case law.  Each of those examples came to light only in an incidental manner; the mere 
fact of their existence, however, points to the probability that there are a significant number 
of cases in which such problems are never discovered. 
 
The approximation inherent in the production and translation of the case law of the CJEU is 
illustrative of the limitations of a multilingual legal system.  The feature that distinguishes 
EU law from international law (and the very reason behind the EU’s language policy) is the 
fact that EU law is applicable to individual citizens in individual member states and therefore 
must be accessible (and effective) in all of the official languages of the EU.  The method of 
teleological interpretation developed by the CJEU and the evolution of the notion of a new 
EU legal language do ensure the effectiveness of EU law to a large extent.  However, the fact 
remains that different languages offer different accounts of reality.  The approximation and 
imprecision inherent in language and translation do have implications for the case law 
produced by the CJEU.  The concept of a single EU legal language that allows EU law to be 
uniformly applied throughout the Union is, in fact, necessarily based on a legal fiction.  That 
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fiction is a workable one, since EU law does function reasonably effectively.  It is 
nonetheless a fiction, and an awareness of the problems of language and translation should 
therefore condition our understanding of the multilingual EU legal order47. 
  
                                                
47 This paper, together with previous work by the author [16-21] is suggestive of a research agenda 
just beginning to be explored.  Problematising the CJEU in terms of its operation as a multilingual, 
multicultural institution also opens up further questions in relation to the role of language in the 
production and application of EU law.  Answering those questions will introduce a new facet to the 
current thinking on the development of the EU legal order.  The present author is currently 
undertaking a 58 month project, funded by the European Research Council, on Law and Language at 
the ECJ (http://erc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document/file/erc_2012_stg_results_all_domains.pdf).  
Any questions or connections are warmly invited (k.mcauliffe@exeter.ac.uk).  
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Figure 1: References for a Preliminary Ruling 
 
 
  
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com 
 
26 
 
Figure 2: Reports for the Hearing 
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Figure 3: Judgments 
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Figure 4: Translation of documents 
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